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ABSTRACT 
In recent decades, insurgents and other nonstate actors with their nontraditional styles of 
warfare have become significant threats to the U.S. and its allies.  Failing to draw lessons 
from past conflicts has been a root cause of the misguided strategies implemented against 
insurgents in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Combating these insurgencies using a military-
heavy strategy has proved to be a drain on both the U.S. economy as well as the military 
forces that have shared the burden of deployments since the onset of operations Enduring 
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.  As a result, the U.S. should consider alternative strategies 
for dealing with insurgents that are both more tactically sound and less taxing on the 
economy and military.  Using special operations forces (SOF) to establish local 
indigenous security forces in under-governed areas is one means of accomplishing this 
goal.  This thesis focuses on the importance of choosing the right indigenous leader and 
force for U.S. SOF to partner with to defeat insurgents through the establishment of 
security, governance, and development at the grassroots level.  A step-by-step process is 
described in this thesis that will assist SOF units in choosing the best local indigenous 
force leader (LIFL) and training him and his force. Also discussed is the importance of 
maintaining that partnership until the LIFL and his force are capable of operating on their 
own, and lines of support and communication have been opened with higher levels of the 
host nation government. 
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Since the beginning of the War on Terror, al Qaeda has displayed resilience at 
spreading radical Islamic beliefs across the globe, creating the need to confront it and the 
insurgencies that adopt its radical ideology.
1
 When looking to spread its beliefs, al Qaeda 
most often targets groups of people that are disenfranchised from their government, and 
are thus easier to influence.  Most often, these groups of people tend to reside in under-
governed territories that are outside the control and influence of the central government.  
Geography is a primary factor when it comes to a government’s limited span of control.
2
  
Many of the countries where al Qaeda has been able to gain support are poor and have 
limited financial resources; the outlying areas typically receive the least support.  In most 
cases, there are stark differences in standards of living as one travels farther away from 
the capital city, with a lack of basic services becoming a leading cause of discontent.  
This has created an environment that suits the development of insurgent cells.  
Ever since the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, the U.S. has taken a 
leading role in fighting the global war on terrorism.  But, with limited military forces and 
resources, and ever-present financial constraints due largely to our own lagging economy, 
our ability to address more than a few al Qaeda threats at any given time is limited.  
Additionally, the heavy-handed tactics the U.S. is presumed guilty of utilizing in past and 
current counterinsurgency (COIN) conflicts has made a military-heavy approach less 
appealing to many foreign governments.  Too often, the destructive and strong-arm 
tactics that are often synonymous with the U.S. do more harm than good by further 
alienating the population from the central government, which in turn plays into the hands 
of the insurgency.  Countries look at the “puppet governments” we have created in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and want no part of those political disasters.  They see the U.S. 
posing a threat to their legitimacy in the eyes of their countrymen and are much more 
                                                 
1
 Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, February 2010.  
2
 LTC Brian Petit, “The Fight for the Village,” Military Review, May–June 2011: 26.  
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willing to accept our financial aid than permit any sizable U.S. military force into their 
country.  As a result, policy makers and senior military advisors to the president have 
little choice but to explore other, more politically acceptable options.  Ideally, those are 
options that are also more feasible given limited military budgets, and options that are 
more strategically sound for the overall conduct of COIN. 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify how U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) can better choose, influence, and leverage indigenous force leaders in order to both 
counter existing insurgencies in under-governed territories and further U.S. and host 
nation (HN) security interests. It builds on the previously published NPS thesis 
“Rethinking Militias: Recognizing the Potential Role of Militia Groups in Nation-
Building,” which dispels the many negative connotations about militias and emphasizes 
the importance of the role these indigenous forces play in COIN.
3
 Specifically, our thesis 
will explore the characteristics an indigenous leader and his force should possess in order 
to best meet the goals described above.   
This thesis focuses on the training and employment of local indigenous forces as 
opposed to existing host nation security forces for a number of reasons.  First, many of 
the under-governed areas that al Qaeda and its affiliates have rooted themselves in are 
historically tribal, with numerous factions existing within each tribe.  Even HN security 
forces are considered to be outsiders by these tribes and factions and are often not 
welcome in villages they don’t belong to.  Secondly, insurgencies often exist in countries 
where the central government is seen as repressive, corrupt, and illegitimate, and where 
existing security forces are viewed as corrupt as well.
4
 A third reason is that local 
indigenous people are more attuned to the habits and attitudes of people in their villages 
and are therefore in a better position to identify who and where the insurgents are.  An 
example of this is Captain John Pershing’s selection of Ahmai-Manibilang as the local 
indigenous leader during the Moro Wars in southern Philippines.  Manibilang’s influence 
and credibility are what allowed him, with the assistance of U.S. advisors, to unite the 
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 MAJ Terry Hodgson and MAJ Glenn Thomas, “Rethinking Militias: Recognizing the Potential Role 
of Militia Groups in Nation Building” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), v. 
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 Daniel Byman, “Going to War with the Allies You have,” Strategic Studies Institute (2005): 12  
 3 
fragmented inhabitants of his region into an organized local indigenous police force 
against the Muslim insurgents.
5
 This is not to say that HN security forces do not have a 
role to play in COIN.  But, it makes more sense to use them in areas where tribal 
ethnicities don’t run as deep and where the population is not as disenfranchised from its 
own government.  Lastly, it may be unrealistic to expect that most developing states in 
the world today will ever have strong, centralized governments with security forces that 
can maintain order throughout their sovereign borders.
6
 In lieu of leaving these countries 
less than fully secured, HN governments may have to grant authority to local security 
forces that already exist and can help provide local security.    
B. THESIS SCOPE 
The primary aim of this thesis is to explore how to identify, train and employ 
suitable indigenous forces in a COIN environment in order to achieve U.S. strategic goals 
while at the same time not threatening or weakening the power and control of the HN 
government.  We will do this by defining the characteristics of the ideal indigenous force 
leader and his indigenous force.  By paying attention to these characteristics, U.S. SOF 
should be able to better identify who the right indigenous force leader is and which is the 
better indigenous force for U.S. SOF to work with in order to further U.S. national 
security interests.  
Investing heavily in finding the right indigenous force leader and force in the 
early stages of a counterinsurgency will increase the likelihood of long term stability 
being achieved between the indigenous forces and the central government.  Initial 
research indicates that too little thought is put into determining which indigenous force 
U.S. SOF should partner with and how the force should be trained and employed. Thus, 
we include in our scope the development of a tailored training and employment plan for 
two different potential real world scenarios.  
                                                 
5
 James R. Arnold, The Moro War: How America Battled a Muslim Insurgency in the Philippine 
Jungle, 1902–1913 (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011), 56. 
6
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C. METHODOLOGY 
The premise of our thesis is how to choose an indigenous force leader in countries 
where U.S. military involvement is limited by the HN government.  In Chapter II, we will 
clarify what we mean by characteristics of a suitable indigenous leader and force.   These 
characteristics will be broken down into two types: internal and external. Internal 
characteristics are those characteristics that make up the leader, what motives him, what 
leadership skills does he already possess, and whether these skills can be leveraged in 
order to meet the goals of the HN and U.S.  External characteristics include the leader’s 
relationship with the community, the local government, and of course the central 
government.  With these characteristics in mind it is possible to identify and assess 
indigenous leaders and forces that U.S. SOF can partner with to conduct COIN and meet 
U.S. long term regional stability objectives.   
In Chapter III, we will examine how to train and employ indigenous forces in a 
COIN environment with the goal of long term stability.  This chapter will also emphasize 
the importance of establishing and maintaining good relations with the HN government 
and existing security forces.  The fourth chapter will then explore how our research and 
ideas can be implemented in countries where insurgencies already exist.  To do this we 
will present two likely scenarios and outline how U.S. SOF can best identify, train, and 
employ indigenous forces to counter the insurgency.  For the first scenario, we will 
consider how U.S. SOF would do this in country “X,” which has a weak government that 
is unable to deal with its existing rural insurgency, an insurgency that threatens U.S. 
objectives and interests.  In contrast, the second scenario will consider how U.S. SOF   
might do this in country “Y,” which has a moderate to strong government fighting a long-
lived insurgency. In both scenarios, countries X and Y will only permit limited U.S. 
military intervention.  Chapter V of this thesis will present the implications of our 
research and our conclusions.   
 5 
There are an inordinate number of theories, models, and strategies that relate to 
waging effective COIN.
7
  In general, the existing literature focuses primarily on 
empirical cases and analyzes which strategies worked and which did not
8 They also point 
to a number of political and military challenges with which the U.S. will have to contend 
when dealing with the HN government and security forces in several countries that are 
currently fighting insurgent groups.
9
 Despite identifying political and military challenges, 
very few of these stress the importance of building the capacity of HN indigenous forces 
to perform the role of a security apparatus at the local level.  To press the issue even 
further, the existing literature offers little substance about how to find a local indigenous 
force leader, let alone forge the kind of force that is best suited to take on the complex, 
dual role of simultaneously serving as both local security and as the political arm of the 
HN government.  
By accepting a more visionary use of indigenous forces in under-governed areas it 
is our contention that the U.S. could decrease the number of U.S. forces required in a 
COIN conflict, permitting the reallocation of military forces and precious financial 
resources elsewhere, as well as permit the U.S. the flexibility to address other emerging 
global threats as they arise.  It is for these reasons that we advocate that the U.S.  accept 
the use of local indigenous forces in under-governed areas of the world where 
insurgencies exist, and that to do so it become much better at determining which 
indigenous forces to partner with in order to achieve its goals. 
                                                 
7
 For a broad discussion of counterinsurgency, refer to: David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare 
Theoryand Practice; Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power; 
Robert M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular 
War; John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam; Ian F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerillas and their 
Opponents since 1750; L. H. Gann, Guerrillas in History. 
8
 Andrew F. Kepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Washington DC: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986). 
9
 Byman, “Going to War With the Allies You Have,” 2–3. 
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II. INTERNAL/EXTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A GOOD 
INDIGENOUS FORCE / INDIGENOUS FORCE LEADER 
Conducting COIN is by all means a difficult and challenging task on every level.  
It involves an immense amount of thinking, learning, and consideration by the external 
military force helping to wage it.  Not only does COIN require combating the insurgents, 
but also positively influencing the people who make up the society of the country where 
the insurgents exist.  In the early stages of a COIN conflict and when HN security forces 
are inadequate to project force, it may be necessary for the external military force to 
assume the role of “Primary Counterinsurgent,”
10 
whose responsibility is to disrupt and 
dismantle the insurgent infrastructure by targeting its leadership.  Over time, however, 
that responsibility needs to shift to HN security forces as they become better trained and 
more capable of defending their communities and maintaining their own security.  In the 
case of countries that are highly tribal and whose communities and villages are 
established along ethnic lines with distinct cultural norms, establishing local security at 
the village level is often already traditionally done.  By choosing the most capable Local 
Indigenous Force Leaders (LIFL) to command these forces, the external military force 
can help ensure long term security and stability against insurgents at the village level.  
Options for narrowing down the search for LIFLs and developing the criteria for 
determining the most capable LIFLs will be further explored in this chapter. 
A. WORKING THROUGH THE U.S. EMBASSY AND INTERAGENCY TO 
FIND THE MOST SUITABLE LIFL 
Once the U.S. makes the decision to become directly involved in a COIN crisis, it 
is important to begin via interagency coordination through the U.S. Embassy.  If a U.S. 
Embassy already exists in a country that is being targeted for a COIN campaign, chances 
are that interagency members of the Embassy already have persons identified who meet 
some of the criteria of a LIFL.  Interagency personnel often spend years in an assigned 
                                                 
10
 William Marm, Bryan Martin, Christopher O’Gwin, Gabriel Szody, Joshua Thiel, Christopher 
Young, and Douglas Borer, “Beyond FM 3–24: Readings for the Counterinsurgency Commander” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010),1. 
 8 
country and, in some cases, work closely with local power brokers who can be rather 
easily gauged for their willingness and ability to take on such a role.  These relationships 
grant embassy personnel the ability to make more in-depth and accurate 
recommendations of potential LIFL nominees which can save valuable time. 
In cases where there is no U.S. Embassy or when members of the Embassy are 
unable to assist, the task of identifying a LIFL can be more challenging.  To help narrow 
down the search, the first thing to be determined is which regions are of strategic 
importance to the government and from where the insurgents are receiving the greatest 
active and passive support.  These areas will present U.S. COIN forces the greatest 
opportunity to affect insurgent infrastructure and operations.
11
  Things that need to be 
taken into account and questions that need to be asked when considering this are: 1) 
whether the locals are supporting the insurgents of their own free will or out of fear and 
intimidation;
12
 2) how open the locals are to the idea of a direct partnership with foreign 
forces to resist the insurgency;
13
 3) is there an existing shadow local indigenous force that 
has demonstrated a desire to resist the insurgency;
14
 4) what is the size and strength of the 
insurgency in this immediate area;
15
 5) what grievances exist among the locals that allow 
the insurgency to gain their support; 6) are the villagers principally or potentially pro-
government;
16
 7) and, finally, are members of the insurgency considered foreigners from 
another tribe or are they members of the community?
17
  By answering these questions the 
Foreign Military Force (FMF) can more accurately judge how receptive locals will be to 
the COIN support they can offer.  Once these questions have been answered the COIN 
force can begin the process of assessing potential candidates to determine who should 
                                                 
11
 Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” Special Warfare, Vol. 18, September 
(2005): 9. 
12
 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 216.  
13
 Petitt, “The Fight For the Village,” 28. 
14
 Petit, “The Fight for the Village,” 25. 
15
 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 13. 
16
 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 31. 
17
 “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency,” Central Intelligence Agency (2011): 9, accessed April 9 
2011, http://fas.org/irp/cia/product/insurgency.pdf. 
 9 
serve as the leader of the security apparatus that will ultimately be responsible for 
protecting their community against insurgent influence. 
Taking on the role of a LIFL is not a job to be taken lightly, especially if the 
leader is effective.  The more effective the LIFL is at performing his duties and the 
greater the amount of support he is able to garner, the greater the risk he runs of being 
targeted by both the insurgents and a weak or paranoid national leader.
18
  This creates 
obvious reasons for the LIFL to be less than fully committed to a job where the pay can 
easily be considered not worth the risk.  What this in turn means is that when attempting 
to embed within a community where no local militias or localized security force yet 
existed, U.S. forces must be very cautious about whom they will choose.  In some cases, 
consulting local governing bodies can be a good place to start when searching for a LIFL.   
Tribal communities where government presence and control is nonexistent rely 
heavily on unofficial government leaders who make up local governing bodies.
19
  Local 
elders, who are typically respected village powerbrokers, historically form these 
governing bodies to deliberate on various topics that influence their community.  As 
such, the governing members should be given an opportunity to recommend or nominate 
who they want to lead their local security force.  In addition to turning to local governing 
bodies as good sources of personal background information for assessing the validity of a 
nominee’s claims and intentions, by granting those bodies the opportunity to make 
recommendations on potential LIFLs, outsiders would be displaying respect for their 
stature and authority, and would be giving them a sense of ownership and control over 
their community’s future.  This can amount to a critically positive show of faith by U.S. 
forces during the critical early stages of the partnership.  Once the local governing body 
has spoken and persons have been nominated, U.S. COIN forces can then begin their own 
assessment of the candidates.  Particular characteristics and qualities that should be 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988), 85 
19
 CJSOTF-A Staff, Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police, Bottom-up 
Counterinsurgency (Bagarm Airbase: CJSOTF-A, 2011), 7. 
 10 
considered important when conducting this assessment are many and can be difficult to 
evaluate, but taking the additional time at this early stage of a COIN campaign to do this 
can pay big dividends later on.  
Accordingly, we have created something akin to a checklist that tactical units or 
other elements can reference when making their assessments.  Additionally, by dividing   
the qualities or characteristics into two categories—Internal and External—the persons 
making the assessment can consider each one independently of the other.  This may be 
especially important in cases where emphasis may need to be placed more on external 
rather than internal considerations (or vice versa). 
B. INTERNAL QUALITIES/CHARACTERISTICS 
During the assessment of potential LIFL candidates, certain information about the 
individuals needs to be identified up front so that the most accurate and informative 
decision can be made by the assessing element.  To do this the nominees need to be 
evaluated using a list of internal qualities and characteristics that will help determine who 
the right person is for the job.  By internal qualities and characteristics we mean personal 
traits, preferences, and beliefs already inherent to a person.  These internal qualities and 
characteristics are further sub-categorized into three areas: motives, personal qualities, 
and willingness to be leveraged by the supporting COIN force.  Given the extenuating 
circumstances and constraints of operating in a hostile environment with little support, 
these qualities and characteristics must be carefully and accurately evaluated. 
To assist the FMF during the assessment in theater, it must first acquire as much 
knowledge about the supported country and indigenous population as possible.  This 
research will begin in the FMF’s home country and continue throughout the duration of 
its partnership with their indigenous forces.
20
  Areas of emphasis the FMF needs to focus 
on are the differences in indigenous tribes and sub-tribe dynamics.  The FMF will also 
need to learn as much as possible about local ties and cultural intricacies of the different 
                                                 
20
 John B. Alexander, Convergence: Special Operations and Civilian Law Enforcement (Tampa: The 
JSOU Press, 2010) 
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tribes and how they feel about rival or neighboring tribes.
21
  Some of this information 
will be difficult to obtain prior to having boots on the ground, and therefore must be 
collected as soon as possible once in-country.  Having a better understanding of these 





The most important internal characteristic that needs to be evaluated is an 
individual’s motives for wanting to take on the role of LIFL.23  There is a great deal of 
risk assumed by taking on such an important and dangerous job, especially since it is not 
likely to produce the monetary reward that it deserves.  Determining an individual’s 
motivation for desiring such an inherently dangerous position will provide the person 
conducting the evaluation a better understanding of who would be best suited to assume 
the position over the long term.  
Critical motivations to look for during the assessment are a consistent discontent 
with or hatred for the insurgents, their ideology, and their actions.  This discontent could 
stem from a number of different causes, but the degree to which it is consistent is 
important.  This is where conducting COIN in tribal regions can be somewhat 
complicated because there may be a dislike for the insurgents, but if both sides are from 
the same tribe, the dislike and discontent may not be consistent enough to inspire 
consistent actions against the insurgents.  Another significant motivation to look for in a 
LIFL is someone who desires to make a better life for himself and his community without 
being oppressed by the insurgents.  Someone who genuinely cares about the people, 
security, and future of his community and ultimately his country are also indicators to 
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  Such a person whose self-interest comes second to his community is the type 
who stands a better possibility of remaining loyal to those he will ultimately be selected 
to protect.    
There are other motivations that evaluators should remain leery of that indicate a 
person desires such a position for the wrong reasons.  Power and authority are typically 
standard reasons for someone seeking a leadership position, but what that person intends 
to do with that power and authority needs to be determined ahead of time.  If a nominee 
appears to be in pursuit of personal interest and financial gain then he stands a high 
probability of falling victim to greed, corruption, and illicit activities like so many leaders 
and persons of authority before him.
25
  Tolerance for corruption of this kind has to be 
limited because it often times ends up alienating the people whose trust and support must 
be maintained, thereby hindering efforts to build community cohesion.
26
  For instance, 
corruption is one of the main points of contention that currently exists between the 
citizens of Yemen and longtime President Saleh.  The discontent has recently risen to 
such a high level that citizens are in the process of carrying out a revolution to have the 
President removed from power.  A similar hostile situation recently existed in Libya.
27
  
Aside from corruption and personal gain, if a LIFL nominee’s motivations appear to be 
towards anything other than fulfilling his obligations to his community and its people, 
then that person should be considered only with great caution. 
2. Personal Qualities 
When the thought of a good leader comes to mind most everyone can recall an 
influential person who was able to “influence people by providing purpose, direction, and 
motivation, while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.”28  
                                                 
24
 Currey, Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American, 281. 
25
 Major Andrew M. Row, “To Create a Stable Afghanistan: Provisional Reconstruction Teams, Good 
Governance, and a Splash of History,” Military Review, Nov–Dec (2005): 22. 
26
 Petit, “The Fight for the Village,” 27 
27
 John Arquilla, “Obama, NATO Should Cut a Deal with Khadafy,” San Francisco Chronicle, April 
24, 2011, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/04/24/inc4ijiv5a.dtl 
28
 Department of the Army, Army Leadership (AR 600–100) (Washington D.C: Department of the 
Army, 2007), 1 
 13 
Whether that recollected person was a leader of something as complex as a nation or 
something as simple as a high school football team, there are common personal qualities 
every leader should possess and project.  Different circumstances call for different 
leadership styles and many leader qualities are consistent regardless of what that person 
is leading.
29
  However, there are some distinct qualities that a LIFL should have in order 
not only to serve as a leader of the force he commands, but to be a conduit between his 
force, the local government, and the community they protect.  Since implementing an 
effective COIN strategy even at the local level is difficult, the LIFL must additionally 
have the skill to juggle both the application of military force and diplomacy.
30
  The 
following are several qualities, listed in no particular order that should be sought out and 
assessed of LIFL candidates.   
A high degree of competency is required of any person taking responsibility for 
the lives of others.  This competence not only has to apply to the duties and 
responsibilities of his position, but also to external factors such as the insurgents.  The 
LIFL must be mentally competent in the knowledge and capability of his forces and his 
ability to organize and employ them in a military and diplomatic manner to effectively 
defend against the insurgents.
31
 At the same time, he must also be competent and 
knowledgeable about his enemy so that he can anticipate their actions and stay one step 
ahead of them.
32
  A leader should also be trustworthy and reliable, not only in the eyes of 
his men but also in the eyes of the community he is protecting.  By being trustworthy he 
will more easily earn the respect of the forces he asks so much of.  The more respect his 
men have for him, the more likely they will be to obey his orders no matter how 
dangerous the situation.  As for the members of his community, the more they trust the 
LIFL and his forces, the more likely they will be to support them instead of the 
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insurgents.  Shifting the community’s support from the insurgents back to the local 
government is the single most important element of carrying out a successful COIN 
campaign. 
Many successful leaders have also become motivators and catalysts through the 
dissemination of their beliefs and ideology which helps them gain the critical backing of 
the forces they command and the population which they need in order to add strength to 
their cause and endure the challenges that lie ahead.
33
  Charismatic leaders of this type 
have an effect on people by promoting a desire to do what is asked of them despite the 
hazards involved, of which there are many when conducting COIN.
34
 Adolf Hitler is 
known as one of the greatest catalysts of all times.  Even though his ideology and cause 
can be considered barbaric, he was still able to successfully gain the support of millions 
of Germans and mobilize them in an effort to rid Europe of all Jews.   
Intuition is another strong internal personal quality that has permitted many great 
leaders to accomplish the impossible when the odds are not in their favor.  A LIFL who is 
intuitive will better be able to prepare and employ his forces to sever the ties between the 
insurgents he is combating and the population he is protecting; this is a task that is very 
delicate and in the case of a well rooted insurgency, extremely challenging.   
Another personal quality that can carry a leader to great lengths is his ability to be 
rational and of fair and sound judgment.  Of no surprise, people with authority and 
power have to make countless decisions of significant impact on a regular basis.  Any 
leader can make decisions based on his own experience and the suggestions of others, but 
it takes a rational leader to make those decisions soundly when under constant threat by 
an enemy that employs unconventional tactics in an attempt to end the lives of him and 
his men.  Additionally, the decisions a LIFL has to make not only directly affect him and 
his men, but also indirectly affect the community he is protecting.  An effective leader 
will have the foresight to identify many of the second and third order effects of his 
force’s actions and make sound and rational decisions based on them.  One way for a 
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leader to be able to better determine these second and third order effects is to be 
empathetic with the members of his community.  By being culturally and personally 
empathetic, he will be able to earn and maintain their support and carry out the 
responsibilities of his position more effectively.
35
 
Recent insurgents, such as those in al Qaeda and the Taliban, have sometimes 
demonstrated an ability to adapt and overcome their adversaries’ tactics.  Because of this, 
U.S. forces have had to perform more reactively than proactively.  This has enabled the 
insurgents to keep one step ahead of our efforts to oppose them.  The LIFL, by being 
more culturally attuned to his surroundings and empathetic to his people, is far more 
likely to be able to identify situations where he can seize the initiative and exploit the 
insurgents’ weaknesses.  When the LIFL and his forces continually seize the initiative 
from the insurgents, they force them to be reactive, which put them in situations where 
they are more likely to implode from a combination of their own mishaps and the efforts 
of the local security force.  To do this, a leader must take a good deal of calculated risk 
into consideration as well as be daring in times of uncertainty.  That is why the LIFL 
must also be a good listener and open to suggestion from local government officials as he 
synchronizes his efforts, as well as those of his subordinates when time permits.  When a 
LIFL does this, it gives his forces a sense of ownership for the dangerous tasks they carry 
out and encourages critical thinking which also helps to build and professionally develop 
subordinates aspiring to become leaders themselves.  Listening to the suggestions of local 
government leaders also helps ensure an equal application of both military actions against 
the insurgents and diplomacy with the population. 
A leader’s ability to effectively communicate is another personal quality critical to 
achieving the results he desires.
36
  Too often problems are not resolved and, in some 
cases, made even worse because the problem itself and the intentions and directives of 
the commander were not correctly communicated to the subordinates responsible for its 
resolution.  Effective communication also instills a sense of encouragement in ones’ 
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followers that their leader is competent regarding a given situation and knowledgeable 
about how most appropriately to handle it.  In extreme situations that may cause harm or 
heartache to those selected to carry out a particular task or operation, the leader must also 
be skillfully persuasive.  Since it is likely a LIFL will ask his men to take risks on a 
regular basis, it is essential that he be persuasive to ensure their continual cooperation, 
commitment, and approval. 
To create the appearance that an insurgency is bigger than it really is, especially 
in the early stages, insurgents will adopt terrorist-style tactics that by nature are immoral 
and unethical.  Insurgents have a common habit of placing security forces in situations 
where they have to make split second decisions to kill the insurgents at the expense of 
civilian casualties.  Opposing an enemy who employs these tactics tends to be difficult, 
dangerous, and resource-intensive for the security forces.  In scenarios such as these, the 
LIFL needs to be both moral and ethical and implement costly measures to protect the 
members of his community and avoid the unnecessary loss of civilian lives.  A LIFL who 
leads in this fashion will not only be able to put himself and his forces in a better position 
to undermine and erode the life of the insurgency,
 
he will also set a positive example as a 
role model for his men and the community.
 37
 
C. LEVERAGING THE LIFL 
In regions of the world that are historically tribal as well as culturally and socially 
isolated from their neighbors, insurgents have been able to more easily control the 
population using coercive methods, especially when there is a lack of government 
presence in these regions.   The inhabitants of these under-governed regions may want to 
resist the insurgents who control them, but may not have the means to do so.  When an 
external government decides it is within its strategic interest to rid these regions of 
insurgents and partner with the locals to do so, it now presents the people of these regions 
with their opportunity.  Establishing local security is an essential step in achieving 
regional stability, but it is not sufficient.  In order to achieve regional stability there must 
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be a formal link between the local villages, through the districts, and up to the provincial 
and national government.  This top-down and bottom-up approach will help to ensure 
synchronized security at all levels.
38
 
For a host of different reasons a village security force and its establishing 
government may be reluctant or even opposed outright to synchronizing efforts beyond 
the community.  Many of these reasons stem from tribal and ethnic differences, 
competition for power between neighboring communities,
39
 the lack of a functioning 
government at all levels, and/or distrust in the central government brought on by 
oppression, greed, and corruption.
40
  Reformation of the government may seem the only 
way to bring about needed changes, but where to begin becomes the issue.  When 
resistance of this type exists it becomes paramount that the leader of the local indigenous 
force be able to be leveraged in a manner that will allow him and his force to overcome 
these aversions and see beyond the parochial interests of their community.
41
  Reformation 
of a nation’s government is no doubt a challenging task, but one that can be achieved 
more easily by simultaneous efforts from both the top-down and bottom-up. 
It also becomes necessary to evaluate the LIFL for his willingness to be leveraged 
in cases where his interests are not exactly nested with those of the local government, and 
more importantly with those of the supporting COIN force’s government.  In war-torn 
countries where the nominees are likely to have been local warlords, their interests and 
motives may not always reach beyond themselves or their community.
42
  In these cases, it 
becomes important that there be other ways to influence them. 
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Assessing the LIFL’s willingness to be leveraged is, no doubt, one of the most 
difficult things the FMF will have to do; what makes this task even more difficult is to 
gauge the LIFL’s willingness to be leveraged in a way that will benefit him as well as his 
force and community.  This particular assessment will need to be readdressed throughout 
the relationship between the FMF and the LIFL because the LIFL’s motives are 
susceptible to change as the he becomes more powerful and influential. 
D. EXTERNAL QUALITIES/CHARACTERISTICS 
When assessing a LIFL you have to take into account the external factors that 
impact that leader and the force. By external characteristics we mean relationships 
between the LIFL and external entities that can have a significant impact on him and his 
force.  These factors include:  his relationship with the community he and his forces will 
be embedded within; his relationship with the local and central governments; his 
relationship with other regional players; rival tribes that reside in the territory he will 
secure; Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO); and even the media. By considering 
these and other factors, the external force will be able to work with community leaders to 
find the best option for the LIFL. 
1. Relationship with the Community within which the Force is 
Embedded 
No matter where you live, when you look at the force that provides your security 
you will find a well-established relationship between the security force leader, the force, 
and the community.  How many times have you been to community functions where the 
keynote speaker was the local security force leader or the event was sponsored by the 
security force?  Cases like this present great examples of a healthy relationship between 
the community and the LIFL and his force.  
In areas where there is a local security force, the relationship between the 
community and the LIFL will need to be assessed to ensure that the LIFL and his force 
are working in support of the community and not against it. If the relationship is already 
strong, all the external force will need to do is observe the relationship ensure that it 
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remains strong. If there is no relationship or the relationship is weak, then the external 
military force will have to work with the LIFL and community to establish a strong, 
positive relationship. 
When working to establish or build such a relationship in regions where no 
security forces exist, mutual respect and trust are key.
43
  The first step in this process is 
for the local governing body to show support for the most capable LIFL candidate.  This 
can be done in regular, open-to-the-population sessions of the local governing body. In 
these open sessions it is best for the governing body to make statements of support for the 
selected force leader and explain what the leader and the force are going to do for the 
community. At the same time, the local population needs to be continually informed 
about the security situation and the actions undertaken by the local security force. This 
can be done by local governing leaders when they address their followers outside the 
governing body forum. In doing this, the theme that must remain consistent is that results 
will come from community members standing up together for the collective defense of 
the local population and local area.
44
  In turn, for their collective cooperation, measurable 
progress is to  be noted  with regard to safety, security, stability, jobs and income, 
education, transportation, health care and an overall better future for the community. 
The second step in this process is for the LIFL and his force to show support for 
the local governing body and the community. This can be done by ensuring that the force 
comes from the local population, thus having direct ties to the community. This can also 
be done by ensuring that all candidates for the security force are vetted through the LIFL 
and local governing body.  These ties should ensure that the actions of the force are in 
keeping with the goals and objectives of the local governing body and population.
45
  The 
importance of these combined displays of support for the indigenous force leader and 
force cannot be overstated.   
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As the LIFL and force start to operate in the local area and have success, the local 
population could begin to turn to the LIFL rather than the local governing body for local 
leadership.  This can be overcome by ensuring that the LIFL and the local governing 
body are working in unison.
46 
 This can be done through regular meetings between the 
LIFL and a representative of the local government to discuss key issues and local 
policies, and, when possible, the local government and local security force leadership can 
be co-located in the same building or compound. While local support is being gained for 
the LIFL, the local governing body and LIFL need to immediately begin building on their 
relations with the district and central governments as well. 
Maintaining unbiased and equal opportunity screening criteria is essential for 
villages where there may be multiple tribes or factions in residence.  In cases such as this, 
the LIFL will have no choice but to remain open to vetting and hiring LIF candidates that 
belong to tribes other than his own.  Being meritocratic will help alleviate claims of 
favoritism and possible tensions between different tribes, and demonstrate the LIFL and 
local governments’ desire to keep the interests of the community foremost.   
2. Relationship with the Local Government 
When you look at the relationship between the government and the security 
apparatus in your local area, you can probably recall occasions when the leadership stood 
side by side, supporting each other. You most likely saw this during times of prosperity 
as well as times of need. Standing together in mutual support demonstrates for the 
community that the relationship between the local government and the LIFL and his force 
is positive and enduring no matter what the situation.   
A community-based indigenous security force needs to be seen by the community 
as a legitimate protective entity and, because of this, needs to have a strong and positive 
relationship with the local government.
47
 The local indigenous force will operate 
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throughout the community in the name of the LIFL and the local government. Because of 
this, the community needs to understand that those in the LIF have been carefully 
selected. 
E. OVERCOMING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND LEADER 
SHORTFALLS  
Recognizing a cultural difference is something else FMFs need to consider before 
partnering not only with a LIFL, but also with his forces.  Just because a candidate LIFL 
exhibits what appear to be practices that would be unethical or illegal in the U.S. does not 
mean that person should not be considered.  For example, in Yemen, national security 
forces chew khat, a narcotic.  This drug is illegal in the U.S., but chewing it has been an 
accepted daily practice in Yemen for years.  Similarly, in Afghanistan, national security 
forces celebrate the Muslim holiday Ramadan which lasts roughly one month.  During 
this holiday all Muslims are required to abstain from consuming food and water during 
daylight hours.  This has a tendency to fatigue security forces who may then appear more 
committed to their religion than to conducting operations against the Taliban.  As long as 
these cultural differences can be managed and do not pose an immediate threat or ethical 
dilemma for the FMF, then the differences should not be considered sufficient to exclude 
someone from being considered as a LIFL or for the LIF. 
Assessing leader characteristics and qualities, as well as motivations, can be a 
difficult task when time is likely limited and trust between the people conducting the 
assessment and the nominee has yet to be established.
48
  Even once the assessment is 
complete there may very well be candidates who turn out to be significantly lacking when 
it comes to meeting the above criteria.  In circumstances such as these it will be necessary 
to choose the nominee who has displayed both the willingness to learn the skills he will 
need to be an effective leader and/or has the greatest potential for being able to be 
leveraged by the COIN forces partnering with him.     
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Insufficient time and lack of trust are just two of the many factors that could 
prevent an in-depth assessment of a LIFL.  If a full-on assessment is not feasible, the 
FMF will have to fall back on assessing the LIFL based on its professional judgment. 
Here is where professional development training over the course of a military career 
should help. As it is, at the end of the day no amount of personal evaluations or character 
assessments of a nominee can guarantee he will be effective and remain aligned with HN 
and FMF interests.  Evaluations are only mitigating steps designed to eliminate as much 
risk as possible.  Arguably, eliminating these risks should be even more likely if the LIFL 
and his force are properly trained and employed.       
  
 23 
III. TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE LIF: CRAWL, 
WALK, AND RUN 
The British experiences in Malaya and Cyprus are interesting cases to review 
when considering how to train an indigenous force since they provide a dramatic after 
several years of trial and error in Malaya, the British developed a successful strategy for 
training indigenous forces that then evolved into the national police and armed forces. In 
Cyprus, the British strategy was generally ineffective, but still offers insights into the 
pitfalls that can occur.  In both Cyprus and Malaya, hostility by major ethnic groups led 
to the need to stand up indigenous forces. In both cases, the degree of success in 
counterinsurgency was largely determined by the effectiveness of the government at the 
central, regional, and local levels in winning the support of the disaffected parts of the 
populace. The training, competence, and leadership the indigenous forces exhibited 
played a central role in each government’s ability to win civilian support.49 
A. ASSESSMENT AND TRAINING PLAN DEVELOPMENT 
Training has always been a key part of building any security force no matter its 
size or shape. Here in the United States, if you want to be part of a security force, 
whether it be a law enforcement organization or the Army, you will attend some form of 
legitimate training that is recognized by the government and the people, and that provides 
the population with a sense of security. In most cases, recognized training programs 
follow the Crawl, Walk, Run methodology. For the purposes of this thesis Crawl refers to 
the training of the LIF by a Foreign Military Force (FMF), Walk refers to the 
employment of the LIF with trainer oversight, and Run refers to unilateral operations by 
the LIF.   
At the start of the Crawl phase is recruiting and screening. In its simplest form, 
recruits are assessed and screened by the force leader and local government. This ensures 
that both parties agree about who is going to best provide security for them and the 
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population. At a minimum, the recruit will need to be physically fit, not addicted to 
drugs, and without a criminal record. The recruit should also be from the local area, 
which is essential for gaining the trust of the people.
50
 At the same time, however, the 
FMF needs to understand that there is no such thing as a perfect recruit; the FMF must 
recognize that with different cultures come different ways of life and different norms.
51
 
The indigenous population is the center of gravity for the FMF and, because of 
this, training will be different for every indigenous group.
52
  In some Middle Eastern 
countries, training is not conducted during certain religious and other, cultural holidays. 
The local culture and way of life will have an effect on the training plan and schedule.  
Because of this, before indigenous recruits are selected, an assessment of the local area, 
the populace, its culture and way of life, along with security needs has to be completed.  
This in-depth assessment will need to be conducted by forces on the ground so that 
training plans can be tailored accordingly.  Taking the time to identify the correct needs 
and conduct assessments to determine how best to meet them can make a big difference 
in a COIN environment. In addition to conducting an analysis of the population, the FMF 
will also need to assess any existing indigenous forces.  This evaluation should include 
looking at the forces’ strengths, weaknesses, logistical concerns, levels of training and 
experience, political or military agendas, fractionalization, external political ties, along 
with cultural “dos and don’ts.” 53  Once the assessment is complete the FMF must employ 
a holistic approach so that the training enhances the legitimacy of both the security forces 
and the local government in the eyes of the local populace, thus gaining their support.
54
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B. LOCAL SUPPORT FOR THE TRAINING PLAN 
With the assessments complete, the FMF should have a training plan in mind.  
This training plan should be devised to ensure that training the force will serve the needs 
of the population. Initially, the training plan should focus on basic policing tasks that are 
designed to improve the skills of the newest recruits, as well as those with prior 
experience and training.  It is imperative that the force be seen by the populace as 
providing it with its protection and not as a local strong arm for the FMF.  The training 
plan should focus on a system that provides security force members with a basic 
understanding of laws and regulations for the specific country, province, and local area in 
question.  In Afghanistan for example, local police who fall under the category of a local 
indigenous force receive training that focuses on the national constitution and ethics, in 
addition to security-specific training.
55
 This security-specific training could last as long as 
three weeks or as short as three days. The length of time available for training will need 
to be determined during the assessment.  
Subjects to be taught could include security-tactics, law enforcement skills, first 
aid, weapons familiarization and marksmanship, vehicle use and vehicle searches, and, of 
course, human rights and proper treatment of detainees.
56
 Once the FMF and the LIFL 
have their basic training plan, the FMF trainers will need to meet with the local governing 
body. The first step to ensure success for the training plan is for it to be accepted and 
supported by the local governing body, whether be a shura, town council, or meeting of 
village elders.
57
  This will grant the governing body and community the opportunity to 
have a say in how the LIFs are trained and employed.  
Once the training plan has been agreed to by the local governing body and the 
FMF, the population needs to also be informed. This can be done in many ways, but the 
important point is that the community be informed by the local governing body, since this 
has been designated to represent the population. Community participation will enable the 
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indigenous force to be seen as integral to the community, especially once the community 
understands what the force intends to deter insurgent activity in the community and 
surrounding area over time.
58
 
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRAINING PLAN 
Once a training plan has been developed and agreed to by the FMF, the local 
governing body, and the LIFL, the next step is to implement the plan. The first group of 
indigenous forces to be trained will receive training directly from the FMF.  This training 
should focus on the lowest level to ensure a positive outcome. Using the trained squad as 
a nucleus for the indigenous force, the FMF can then move to a “train the trainer” 
methodology.
59
  This will allow the LIF to take eventual ownership of the training and 
provide a sense of connection between itself and the population, so that it is not seen as a 
puppet of the FMF. Simultaneous with the training of the lower echelons, the FMF will 
also provide leadership training for those individuals who have been so identified.    
Again, leaders will be chosen based on their ability to operate independently in an 
ambiguous, dynamic, and politically sensitive environment, while representing the local 
government, the population, and, of course, the chain of command.
60
  Leaders at all levels 
in any force must be able to communicate, lead, and train. In order to do these things 
effectively all leaders themselves need training. This training should consist of some core 
leader competencies, as well as instruction in how to communicate with the force, and, 
even more importantly, the population. It should also include sections on how to develop 
subordinates, and, most important, how to lead by example.
61
 
Once the initial force, to include the leaders and those identified as future trainers, 
has been trained, the FMF trainers can begin to step aside and let the LIF lead training.  
The FMF will still provide mentorship and support when needed and even assist with the 
training when required. As members of the LIF become the primary trainers they should 
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earn credibility in the eyes of the populace, thus gaining the force greater legitimacy with 
the population. With the LIFL and LIF taking the lead in terms of training and 
development, the LIF should start to grow and provide both the local government and the 
population with security.  Once villages sense greater control over their own security, and 
once they feel the future is more stable and predictable, this should in turn lead to more 
stable districts, more stable provinces, and, finally, a more stable country.
62
 
Although basic in nature, training is only the first step in the LIF’s process of 
becoming a legitimate and capable security force.  Ideally, the training will be conducted 
in a non-hostile environment where trainees can focus on the task at hand and where 
mistakes can be easily addressed and corrected.  However, if the situation on the ground 
does not dictate formal, classroom type training, trainees may be forced to learn to 
perform their jobs through trial and error at a much faster pace while patrolling the streets 
within their villages.  To further assist the LIFL and his force following the training, the 
FMF needs to reinforce proper employment of the instruction just received. It can best do 
this by assisting the LIF in ambiguous situations for which the training itself may not 
have appropriately prepared them.  To do this in the most effective manner possible, once 
the initial training is complete the FMF needs to remain partnered with the LIF and 
operate bilaterally with it to ensure training is being properly implemented and to further 
develop the LIF’s capabilities.   
Known as the “Walk” phase, this is when the LIF will have an opportunity to 
become more familiar and comfortable with its duties and responsibilities as a local 
security force and practice its new skills through real-world application.  During the early 
stages of the Walk phase, the FMF will provide direct supervision and mentoring to the 
LIF.  Day to day operations will be closely monitored and, when needed, led by the FMF.  
This level of oversight will continue until the point when the LIF has demonstrated its 
ability to operate more independently.     
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It is pertinent that the LIF understand the importance of continued FMF presence 
beyond the initial training.  By remaining in the village with the LIFL and his force, the 
FMF members can further develop them into a professional force with intelligent and 
competent leaders at every level.
63
  Had the security forces that U.S. forces supported 
against communist insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala received attention during the 
employment phase of the training they received, they may not have committed the human 
rights violations with which they were accused.
64
  A sustained FMF presence will also 
assist the LIF in overcoming the steep learning curve it will encounter while executing 
COIN.  Because the initial training the LIFL receives will likely consist of little more 
than basic policing skills and classes on human rights, the need for the FMF to remain in 
direct partnership with it is crucial.  The FMF will not only be in a better position to 
provide continued oversight for future training and employment, but will also be able to 
ensure the LIFL and his force are receiving adequate pay,  have the logistical and 
operational support they need in order to remain effective, and  retain essential 
cooperation from the local governing body. 
D. LIFL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR) 
Determining a LIF’s AOR can be difficult, but in general this should include 
everyone who resides within the immediate vicinity of a village.
65
  This guideline was 
developed in Afghanistan given who the insurgents targeted for support.  A second 
reason for this guideline is the LIF will likely have limited mobility assets and few 
resources, thereby limiting its ability to project power and authority beyond its immediate 
area.  Asking men to take on responsibilities beyond the immediate village will cause the 
LIF to overreach which will then make it vulnerable to insurgent attacks.  This is where 
an outer ring of security provided around the village by conventional forces comes into 
play.   
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It is important to keep in mind that the LIF and the security it provides should 
always be part of a grander “concentric security system” that involves close coordination 
with other security elements.  Conventional forces belonging to the HN, a supporting 
foreign military, or both must take on the responsibility of serving as outer security and a 
Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for the LIF and its villagers.  The security the LIF can 
provide by conducting intensive patrols on the outskirts of the village should afford the 




E. WHERE TO EMPLOY THE LIFL 
Just as assessments were conducted to determine which villages to select for FMF 
partnership, a similar assessment needs to be undertaken to determine where to focus 
security efforts within the village.  This is where working with and through the locals can 
pay big dividends because they have better knowledge of the people, terrain, where in the 
village the insurgents are residing and operating, what transit routes they use, and what 
areas are under their influence.
67
  Armed with this knowledge, the LIFL and FMF will 
better know where to concentrate their efforts.  This is not to say that other areas should 
be ignored or denied security.  Just the opposite in order to survive, insurgents have 
become increasingly adaptive and all too familiar with the need to pick up and move 
when pressure against them is increased.  Rarely do insurgents hold ground, especially 
when odds are against them.
68
  As such, the LIF’s presence needs to be sustained to a 
degree throughout the entire village.   
F. HOW TO EMPLOY THE LIF 
From a security standpoint, employing COIN tactics requires a thorough 
understanding of the people and the area being targeted.  Employment of the LIF should 
be centered on “neutralizing insurgent presence in a village or area, developing and 
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maintaining a secure environment, and securing the willing support and participation of 
the local population.”69  In order to achieve these ends, the LIF and FMF must display an 
unwavering commitment to their cause, and more so than the insurgents.  The overall 
purpose of the LIF in COIN is to serve as a defensive force that protects village 
inhabitants from insurgent control and influence.  Operations that can assist the LIF attain 
this include establishing random checkpoints, conducting security patrols during both day 
and night, emplacing ambushes along suspected insurgent lines of operation (LOO), 
collecting intelligence, and engaging in other measures that actively seek to disrupt 
insurgent activity.  During the conduct of these operations, the LIF and its partnered FMF 
must make it well known that the village is being protected 24/7.
70
 
Although the LIF is designed to operate in primarily a defensive role, there will 
still be times when it will need to take offensive measures to target insurgent 
infrastructure.
71
  Depending on the strength of the insurgency, these offensive operations 
can range in scope from cordon and search of suspected enemy compounds to more 
elaborate operations that seek to root out significant insurgent forces.  These types of 
operations need to be taken into consideration when developing the training plan for the 
LIF.  If a LIFL and the FMF determine the threat is more than they can handle, existing 
HN security forces or larger conventional forces can be called in since presumably they 




G. EXPANDING THE “INK BLOT” 
As the LIF and the local government become more integrated and prove capable 
of employing a holistic approach, to include civic programs designed to improve human 
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capital, the community should become more closely knit and supportive of both.
73
  As 
security in the village increases locals will have more incentives to provide the LIF with 
actionable intelligence about insurgent activities.
74
  The availability of basic services and 
a better standard of living should help to ensure a long term stable environment free of 
insurgents and their coercive measures.  Once the LIF has progressed to the “Run” phase, 
where it is capable of operating unilaterally, the FMF can then expand its efforts to 
neighboring villages so as to increase the seamlessness of government-controlled 
territory, sometimes referred to as the “ink blot.”75  The FMF that once served as advisors 




H. THE END GAME 
Developing or improving the quantity and capabilities of indigenous forces, 
ensuring that there is an integrated and unified approach between the LIFL, local 
government, and the FMF, and increasing the security of the population, are all key to 
waging a successful COIN campaign. As previously stated, the first step of this process is 
selecting of the proper FMF, making sure it has suitable personnel to be COIN advisors 
in a foreign country, and that they are properly trained and equipped.
77
  The next step is 
to find, access, and develop the LIFL. Once this is done, the FMF with the support of the 
LIFL and local governing body can take the steps identified in this chapter to train the 
LIF.  The support of the local government and population is crucial. This is why proper 
training and employment of LIFL and LIF is so important; they have to be able to work 
within the community and meet the community’s needs.  
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Only by taking this “train the trainer” approach and through a “crawl-walk-run” 
methodology can the LIF be incorporated as a dependable fully functioning force.  With 
proper training and coaching, the LIF should be able to eventually conduct operations 
unilaterally and thereby provide security and maintain order, destroying or negating 
insurgent networks, protecting friendly infrastructure, and allowing for continued 
development and improvement of its own community.   
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IV. REAL-WORLD APPLICATION 
In an effort to demonstrate the utility of finding the right LIFL, and properly 
training and employing him and his force to be able to execute COIN, this chapter will 
describe  how the prescriptions outlined in this thesis are flexible enough to be employed 
in two distinctly different scenarios.  By using these scenarios, we will demonstrate the 
utility of this thesis, which describes how U.S. SOF can better choose, influence, and 
leverage indigenous force leaders and their force in order to both counter existing 
insurgencies in under-governed territories, and further U.S. and HN security interests.  If 
scenario-based planning is done well and its insights are acted upon promptly, the U.S. 
military may be better poised to help deter prospective threats, or dissuade enemies from 
creating threating new capabilities in the first place.
78
 In both scenarios we will be using 
the Village Stability Operations (VSO) concept as the platform for finding, training and 
employing local indigenous forces.  
A. ASSUMPTIONS 
In order to focus more attention on the indigenous leader and his force, we have 
made a number of assumptions regarding coordination and interaction among the U.S. 
Department of Defense, other U.S. agencies, and the HN government. Our first 
assumption is that the U.S. government has a clear National Security Strategy with a goal 
that supports counterinsurgency operations in countries “X” and “Y.” The second 
assumption is that funding has already been approved under Title 10 (funding provided to 
the U.S. Army), Title 20 (funds provided for national defense), and 1206 (funds that are 
allowed to be used in long term engagements with indigenous forces). The third 
assumption is that the tactical and operational units selected to conduct these 
counterinsurgency operations are already properly manned, equipped, and trained. Our 
final assumption is that the HN government has agreed to this engagement.  
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B. COUNTRY X 
Country X gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire in the early 1900s.  
Between 1918 and 1962 Country X was a monarchy ruled by a very prominent family 
from within the region, but still influenced by the British. In 1962, the northern part of 
Country X then became a republic, but Britain retained a protectorate over the area 
around Country X’s southernmost port. Britain withdrew in 1967 and the area became 
Southern Country X and, in 1970, Southern Country X adopted a Communist-style 
government. In 1990, it formally united with the North to become the Republic of 
Country X. Since then, Country X has been ruled by a president who came to power 
through a military coup and has since installed many cronies and family members, to 
include family members overseeing internal security. Over the course of the past decade, 
the government has been fighting an armed insurgency in the northern part of the 
country, while at the same time fighting a regional opposition movement in the south. 
The insurgency in the northern part of the country is calling for a more tribal government, 
with the tribes to have a larger say in governance.  In the southern part of the country the 
opposition movement is calling for more democratic changes and more government aid.  
At the same time, the south is also calling for a larger redistribution of government profits 
from oil and natural gas revenues.  
Currently, Country X consolidates most of its security forces in the urban areas 
and areas around the capital region, leaving most of the other regions and rural areas 
without any meaningful security presence.  Country X’s national infrastructure is failing 
and is in disrepair because the country does not invest in education and is also unable to 
contract outside companies to come improve its infrastructure because the companies 
would have to pay hefty “special taxes” in order to operate inside Country X. Country 
X’s water system, for instance, is increasingly over-burdened and neglected, and 35% of 
its population does not have easy access to clean drinking water. Additionally, Country 
X’s oil reserves are being depleted and it is expected that Country X’s oil fields will be 
finished by the end of the next decade.  
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1. Al Qaeda’s Involvement in Country X 
Over the past decade al Qaeda has been able to establish a large terror network 
with deep roots that run across Country X; al Qaeda has done so by applying lessons 
learned from mistakes made in other safe haven states. It is believed that al Qaeda has 
worked very hard to curry favor with local tribes inside County X. al Qaeda leaders 
inside Country X have been able to form their messages to fit Country X’s  local 
grievances, including the lack of economic benefits from Country X’s oil and gas 
revenues. In reaction to al Qaeda messages about inequalities, many tribal leaders in 
remote regions and rural areas have allowed their sons to join al Qaeda and provide the 
terrorist organization protection from government forces. At the same time, some tribal 
leaders view attacks on al Qaeda in their lands as attacks on the tribes themselves. In 
order to ensure that al Qaeda maintains its positive relations with Country X’s citizens 
and these tribes, it has limited its attacks inside Country X to western targets and Country 
X security officials. In order to maintain its status inside Country X, AQ also provides 
many of the services that Country X has not been able to provide to its citizens in remote 
regions and rural areas, by doing things like digging wells, offering medical treatment, 
and even providing monthly allowances to many of the people within communities that al 
Qaeda interacts with on a regular basis. This has allowed Country X to become one of the 
biggest hubs, training centers, and staging grounds for al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP)’s operations, to include several attacks against U.S. interests.  
2. U.S. Involvement in Country X 
Prior to September 11, 2001, U.S. involvement in Country X was focused on 
helping to develop Country X’s naval and coast guard forces, along with other security 
forces and the national police. After the attack on September 11, U.S. policy in Country 
X turned to fighting al-Qaeda.  In 2009, Country X received $180 million in aid from 
USAID and another $80 million in military aid, and the U.S. conducted targeted strikes 
against key al-Qaeda leaders in Country X.  In 2010, it is believed that Country X 
received nearly $375 million in U.S. aid. At the same time, U.S. officials were largely 
restricted to the capital region due to rules emplaced by Country X which invoked 
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security concerns.  This prevented U.S. officials from being able to oversee how their 
funds were being used outside the capital region. As of late, the U.S. has returned to a 
focused development of Country X’s naval and coast guard forces, and of security forces 
within the urban areas and capital region. 
3. A Solution in the Making 
Fast forward to 2015, after more than 15 years of financial and limited military 
assistance, the U.S. (finally) adopts a COIN approach that would establish local 
indigenous security forces in remote regions and rural areas of Country X.  The aim of 
this approach is to allow Country X to provide a secure and safe environment for its 
citizens and reduce possible flashpoints for Country X’s central government. At the same 
time, it answers the call by other countries to remove al Qaeda threats from within 
County X’s borders.  This COIN approach is based on the VSO concept that met with 
some success in Afghanistan.  
VSO employs a bottom-up methodology that strengthens and stimulates village 
social structures to provide security, enable development, and nurture local governance.
79
  
By conducting these kinds of operations, Country X will be better able to establish local 
security forces in more remote regions and rural areas. Additionally, Country X’s actions 
will greatly decrease al Qaeda’s ability to operate in the open and force it to reduce its 
activities inside Country X, ideally leaving it altogether.  To accept this plan, Country X 
will have to significantly increase the number of security forces dedicated to securing all 
of its terrain and not just urban areas.  The overall aim is to establish a secure 
environment throughout Country X, which will in turn allow villages to establish 
effective governance and begin to address villagers’ needs on behalf of the provincial and 
central governments.   
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4. Executing the Plan 
Prior to deploying a U.S. SOF element to Country X, a small team representing 
the command and control (C2) cell will deploy to Country X. En route to Country X this 
element will visit with key agencies in Washington DC and gather information critical to 
helping identify the right LIFL, while at the same time ensuring that each agency 
understands what the U.S. SOF unit has been tasked to do. Once in Country X, this 
element will meet with key individuals within the U.S. embassy to include the 
ambassador, CIA station chief, the Military Assistance officer, and the Defense Attaché. 
In these meetings all parties will be briefed on what the U.S. SOF team will be doing in 
Country X and, of course, gather information that will include possible VSO sites and 
LIFL candidates. Once all meetings at the embassy are complete the U.S. SOF team will 
meet with key individuals within Country X’s security forces, to include the intelligence 
arm, to determine where the first VSO site should be located and to identify possible 
LIFL candidates.  During these meetings the U.S. SOF team will ensure that key players 
in Country X understand how important it is to choose the right site and LIFL, and how a 
successful VSO will improve Country X over time.  
Once initial planning and final coordination is complete, the initial team will 
deploy, made up of three elements: a C2 team, an operational team, and a team to serve 
as quick reaction force (QRF) while it starts to develop its plan for setting up a second 
VSO site. Once in Country X and after the U.S. SOF team has established its C2 cell in 
the U.S. embassy and the QRF team is functional, the operational team will  have a small 
two man team from County X’s special operations forces attached to it. The purpose of 
this two man team is to guarantee the central government some oversight as well as to 
ensure that HN SOF (or their equivalent) can observe the development of the LIFL and 
the VSO program. When the augmented U.S. team leaves the capital region, it will once 
again meet with local leaders    
In these meetings, the U.S. SOF team will work with the area elders and power 
brokers to help them understand what a successful VSO site with the correct LIFL would 
do for their area. A successful VSO site would allow for infrastructure development to 
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improve, to include the building of schools, clinics and other key infrastructure nodes. 
Additionally a secure area will allow NGOs to move into the area and provide aid as well 
as agricultural assistance in an effort to help Country X overcome its poor farming 
techniques that have led to a fresh water shortage across the county.  The operational 
team will help them understand that with security comes development, aid, and a voice at 
the governing table. Once all the meetings and a final assessment of the area have been 
conducted, the operational team will return to the capital region and work with the C2 
node and other key individuals inside the embassy and Country X government to select a 
final location and a LIFL. Once these decisions have been made the operational unit and 
members of Country X’s government will once again move into the selected area and 
meet with the local leaders and powerbrokers.  
This is the key point in the operation because all parties involved have to agree on 
the location of the first VSO site and the first LIFL. In the past the president of Country 
X has been hesitant to develop security forces outside urban areas, thus the establishment 
of this site will set the tone for future sites in Country X and become the power center for 
its region. Success in this first location is the doorway to success in other areas of 
Country X. Once all parties have agreed on this location and the LIFL, the operational 
team along with key local leaders will approach the LIFL and suggest to him that he and 
his force serve as the local security force in the selected area. The local leaders and the 
U.S. operational unit will also explain his duties and responsibilities to the LIFL and 
ensure that everyone at the table understands what is expected and how the VSO program 
works. Once again, the U.S. SOF team will ensure that everyone understands the benefits 
of establishing the VSO site.  The operational team will also work with the LIFL and 
local leaders to determine the size of the LIF element, based on the geography and 
demographics of the villages in the area. The LIFL and the operational team will work 
together to determine who the LIFL should initially try to recruit.  If the LIFL already has 
a force, the SOF team will need to work with him to determine which members of the 
LIFL’s force will need to be dropped or whether members need to be added.  If the 
LIFL’s force is to be reduced, he and the SOF team need to make sure they won’t create 
new insurgent forces from those they let go.  At this time, the guidelines would be set for 
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assessment and selection.  To be in the LIF each candidate has to first reside in the 
selected area or village, be confirmed by the LIFL and other senior members of the 
village, and, finally, be screened using biometric devices to check for any past history of 
criminal activity. Once the LIF candidates have been identified they will next participate 
in a selection and assessment process to ensure that the right candidates are chosen.  
Prior to the beginning of training, the operational team will work alongside the 
local governing body to establish the VSO site and get mission essential supplies and 
equipment delivered to it.  On the agreed date all parties will meet at the established VSO 
site/training area. This area needs to be large enough to house the LIF, the operational 
team, and any attachments from the host government that may want to oversee the 
training and employment of the LIF. Once on site, the U.S. SOF team will explain to the 
LIF what is going to take place over the next three weeks.  
Once the briefings are complete the operational team along with the LIF will 
follow the priority of instruction (POI) regarding in-processing and the issuing of mission 
essential supplies and equipment. The importance of having the proper equipment and 
training cannot be overstated when it comes to winning tactical engagements with well-
armed insurgents.
80
   
The first part of the POI will be classroom-based, with some field training on a 
prescribed training site. Once the LIF and the LIFL reach a point where the LIF can 
operate at a functional level, the training will move to an “on the job” phase when the 
operational team will work alongside it. This will continue until the LIF and the LIFL 
have demonstrated that they are capable of operating on their own in their AOR. As this 
is happening, the LIFL will interact with the populace and the local government from the 
lowest levels up to the district level in order to earn the respect of the people that the 
LIFL has been charged to protect. Only by gaining and maintaining respect and authority 
from the population and the local government will the LIF and LIFL be able to guarantee 
the security that will in turn enable local development.
81
  In doing this the LIF, the host 
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nation along with the FMF will be able to  push out any formal or in formal organizations 
who have been taking advantage of the security situation to conduct attacks against the 
host nation or other countries. The final step in the training POI is to receive certification 
from the local governing body, along with certification from the district and provincial 
governments. In granting this, these governing bodies will reinforce for the population 
that they believe in and stand behind the LIF and LIFL. 
5. HN Takes the Lead – Insurgency Declines  
Now that the HN government has officially certified the LIF force, it can start to 
conduct operations on its own, while the U.S. SOF teams serve as its QRF. Over time, the 
U.S. SOF team will slowly withdraw from the area, but come back and meet with the LIF 
and community leaders from time to time. At this point, the LIF is operating on its own 
free of oversight from the U.S. SOF team. The host nation is working with the local 
government and the LIF to improve relations and infrastructure in the local area. 
Additionally through the use of NGOs and education the local area are able to address the 
fresh water shortage issue along with crop rotation plans that impacts the water table to 
include the reduction of the number that do not produce crops that can feed and sustain 
the people of Country X. 
With the first VSO site established, the operational team that established the LIF 
becomes the U.S. SOF QRF force and the former QRF team conducts operations to 
establish the 2
nd
 VSO site and LIF.  Thanks to the establishment of the first LIF, 
insurgent activity in the region should already be severely hindered and any popular 
support the insurgency once had in the community should be dissipating.  This will force 
any insurgents to migrate to regions that have not yet been secured by LIFs, which will 
make them easier targets for HN conventional forces to locate and destroy.  The HN, 
along with NGOs and United States Agency International Development (USAID), will 
also now be able to move into the secure area and start to work with the local government 
and populace to improve infrastructure, build schools, and improve the general living 
conditions and quality of life of the population. 
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C. RISE OF AND CURRENT STATE OF THE INSURGENCY 
IN COUNTRY Y 
Marxist-Leninist insurgents have been active in Country Y since 1964.  Since the 
birth of their insurgency up through the early 2000s, they have been able to increase their 
active and passive membership thanks to an ideology centered on more equal distribution 
of wealth, otherwise manipulated by the elite via government welfare programs that 
primarily reward those who live in urban areas and major cities.  The insurgents today are 
largely able to sustain their operations through their involvement in the drug trade. In 
exchange for their “protection,” insurgents tax the cocaine and marijuana that are 
produced in the rural areas by peasant farmers who work for the drug cartels.  The 
insurgents are feared in Country Y as well because of their kidnappings of wealthy 
citizens and government officials.  This provides another source of funding and a further 
means to leverage the government to meet their political demands.   
Support for the insurgents began to gradually decline in the early 2000s after the 
newly elected president began receiving significant foreign assistance from the U.S. and 
other allied countries.  As per the terms of these bilateral agreements, the president used 
aid to expand the size and capabilities of the country’s security forces in order to defeat 
the drug cartels and insurgents, as well as to regain control over the countryside. Foreign 
assistance money also went to humanitarian and social development projects in some of 
the rural areas that had once been controlled by the insurgents.   As a result of the 
government’s expansion into the rural areas, its revised economic policies, and its 
democratic security strategy, popular support for the government has increased over the 
past ten years, while support for the insurgent ideology has waned.  Yet despite the 
growing economy and an attempt to expand government services and programs to 
members of the lower classes living in rural areas, the insurgents maintain their position 
about the need for further economic reform.   
1. Current Situation 
Today the insurgent strength in Country Y is roughly 9,000 armed members with 
another 9,000 active members who collect intelligence and provide logistical support.  
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The insurgents maintain their cells in the densely vegetated rural areas where security 
forces have a difficult time detecting them.  They are well armed with a variety of 
machineguns and automatic weapons, and indirect fire assets to include mortars of 
various sizes.  In an effort to rebuild their support base and regain leverage in the political 
arena, the insurgents are becoming bolder with their attacks, mainly aimed at government 
security forces.   The insurgents continue to use the support and sanctuary of the densely 
vegetated rural areas of the country to launch from, but are increasingly choosing targets 
in urban areas to project the image that they are bigger than they really are.
82
  The attacks 
they conduct are primarily guerrilla-type hit and run attacks or bombings aimed at 
highlighting government weakness.   
This rural-based insurgency has proven difficult for the government to root out.  
For one, there simply are not enough military and police to deploy to the numerous 
isolated regions the insurgents occupy.  Secondly, targeting the cells and leadership of the 
insurgency through kinetic means only temporarily affects them until replacements can 
be named.  As long as government presence and control remains minimal in the remote 
areas the insurgents use for sanctuary, insurgent influence will prove more relevant to the 
population residing there.   Drug production and the protection the insurgents provide the 
farmers offers the peasants a better way of life than the government can currently 
provide.  Until the situation for the peasants changes, the government will continue to be 
involved in a persistent and protracted fight against the insurgents. 
2. A Solution in the Making 
Fast forward to 2017 and after more than 18 years of financial and limited 
military assistance, the U.S. proposes the use of a COIN approach that recently proved 
successful in Afghanistan against the Taliban insurgents.  The U.S. wants to help Country 
Y defeat the insurgents through other than just military means.  Establishing local 
governance in the rural isolated areas in conjunction with developing local security forces 
to help drive out the insurgents will deny the insurgents access to their most important 
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asset, the population.  Again, the VSO concept is being adapted.  While the concept itself 
is well known by this point, there is more to it than is generally recognized.  In fact, U.S. 
SOF had a learning curve that they themselves had to overcome before they could begin 
to reap the fruits of their labor. 
The first challenge U.S. SOF became aware of when executing VSO was how to 
select the best qualified LIFL.  When the concept was first introduced in Afghanistan in 
2009 not a lot of emphasis was placed on whom exactly to select to serve as the LIFL.  
Some LIFLs were selected because they were nominated by members of the Afghan 
government who were from the affected region.  Others were selected because of the 
amount of power and influence they already had established in the area.  As the U.S. soon 
realized, selecting a LIFL for these reasons alone was not always sufficient to ensure he 
was the most suitable person for the job.  A second challenge U.S. SOF faced was that 
the LIFs were not trained to an acceptable standard prior to their being placed into action 
unilaterally as local police.  A third challenge that had to be overcome was that even if 
U.S. SOF did have sufficient time to complete the training POI created for the Afghan 
Local Police (ALP), their success was not guaranteed.  A lack of sustained direct 
oversight by the partnered U.S. SOF teams until the ALP was capable of performing their 
role unilaterally led to problems in the field.  For instance, one team caught an Afghan 
National Army commander using his authority to exploit villagers in Khakrez when his 
coalition partners were not around.
83
 
The urgent desire to expand the VSO concept in critical regions of Afghanistan as 
quickly as possible to meet presidential timelines for the pullout of U.S. forces 
presumably explains why these three critical steps for conducting successful VSO were 
overlooked.  However, once the need to place greater emphasis on these three steps was 
recognized, U.S. SOF began to experience greater success in the overall acceptance of the 
ALP by villagers, as well as their improved performance as local defense forces in 
remote areas of the country.   
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In addition to U.S. SOF taking this village-centric approach in Afghanistan, 
Afghan SOF was also trained to conduct this mission unilaterally.  This greatly increased 
the number of forces dedicated to the effort and, after eight years, the program proved 
sufficiently successful that villages proved able to establish local governance that could 
then begin addressing their broader needs.  These efforts greatly decreased the strength of 
the Taliban and caused them to either give up their struggle or retreat to areas that were 
too remote and too small to pose a significant threat. 
Hoping to capitalize on its VSO experiences in Afghanistan, the U.S. offers 
Country Y military assistance to conduct similar village-centric COIN operations using a 
small contingent of SOF.  Country Y approves the U.S.’s offer for assistance, but only 
under the condition that U.S. SOF leads the efforts until its own SOF units are trained 
adequately to take the lead themselves.
84
  U.S. SOF receives mission approval and begins 
movement to Country Y.  Excellent relations with Country Y’s government and security 
forces developed over the past several decades help facilitate all planning with HN 
counterparts.   
3. Executing the Plan 
Once in-country one of the first orders of business for the U.S. SOF teams is to 
determine locations of strategic importance where the insurgents are located.
85
  They do 
this by consulting with intelligence personnel belonging to both Country Y and the U.S. 
(the U.S. has had a sizable intelligence office in the embassy for many years).  Because, 
in this scenario, U.S. SOF will be partnered with HN SOF throughout the entire COIN 
mission, the HN SOF also conducts parallel planning to identify insurgent sanctuaries in 
strategic locations.   
U.S. and HN SOF next seek out villages that have openly displayed opposition 
towards the insurgents in the past.  Matching these locations with strategic locations 
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where the insurgents are still present drastically narrows the number of potential villages 
suitable for initial COIN support.  This is because most of the peasants who provide 
sanctuary for the insurgents are content with the situation they have created for 
themselves and their families, making it difficult to find whole villages that would oppose 
the insurgents in return for U.S. and HN support.  Nevertheless, five locations are 
identified and the SOF teams get busy coordinating to try and identify candidates to serve 
as the LIFLs.  U.S. SOF consults with personnel and government agencies working in the 
U.S. embassy to see if they have any candidates to nominate.  Meanwhile, HN SOF 
check with their sources to try and identify LIFLs in the designated regions based on the 
Internal and External Characteristics they have been given. 
With a list of potential LIFL candidates in hand, U.S. and HN SOF infiltrate their 
respective regions in conjunction with larger conventional forces who will help set the 
necessary conditions for the SOF teams to conduct COIN, as well as to provide much 
needed security and serve as a QRF until a LIF can be established.  One point that was 
made clear to the HN SOF teams early on in the planning for this mission was the 
importance of finding the right LIFL.  As such, the SOF teams were to take as much time 
as needed to thoroughly vet the LIFL candidates before choosing one.  The circumstances 
for doing this turn out to be different for each of the five teams, with the fastest vetting of 
a LIFL taking only six days.  This particular LIFL was an individual who was well 
known and was recommended by a CIA member working out of the embassy.  The 
longest it took a team to select a suitable LIFL was twenty seven days.  This was because 
none of the preliminary candidates turned out to be acceptable once the team was 
embedded in the village and did further vetting.  The team, therefore, had to conduct a 
series of meetings with the locals to try and come to a consensus on who should be 
selected.  Things became even more complicated at this location when the nominee who 
received the most support from the villagers did not want the job for fear that his family 
would be harmed by the insurgents.  Negotiations ensued and the nominee finally agreed 
to accept the task.   
Upon confirming that HN and U.S. assistance would be accepted, the teams 
rewarded the villages by allowing each to nominate a project of its choice that would 
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benefit the community as a whole.  This idea was very popular, especially once villagers 
realized the materials for the projects would be purchased from within their villages and 
stimulate the local economy.
86
  Additionally, as per the agreement with the Minister of 
Interior of Country Y, weapons and equipment were delivered so that LIFLs could begin 
the hiring and vetting of the indigenous force each would help train and command.  
Based on the geography and demographics of the villages, a number was designated for 
how many LIF personnel each location could hire.  Offering salaries only slightly smaller 
than those of the national police, teams had no problem meeting their LIF manning 
requirements.  To be selected to serve as a LIF, each candidate had to reside in the 
village, be confirmed by the LIFL and other senior members of the village, then be 
screened using biometric devices which cross-referenced national databases to check for 
any past history of criminal activity.  Once a candidate passed these three hurdles he was 
added to the ranks and immediately began training.  For this particular scenario each 
village trained its LIF using an intense pre-determined three week POI tailored 
specifically for County Y.  Security to allow SOF and the LIF to complete the POIs was 
provided by the conventional forces who vigorously patrolled the peripheries and, in 
some cases, fought off curious insurgents attempting to regain lost territory.   
While the LIFL and his force received their three weeks of training, 
representatives from the district government were doing their part to establish a local 
government at each location; at a minimum they identified someone who would represent 
the village and coordinate with the district leadership.  This village representative was 
confirmed by a vote by a majority of the villagers and introduced to the duties of his new 
position.  With a decisive link now established between the local and the district 
governments, and a local security force to help keep out the insurgents, the village had 
the makings of a framework to overcome barriers built between the two by insurgents 
over the years.
87
  With the assistance of their district government and funds allocated to 
the COIN program, the villages were granted limited materials and agricultural supplies 
so they could farm cash crops other than coca and marijuana.  When the villagers realized 
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that there was money to be made by growing produce that could be taken to market 
openly and, in some cases, exported they accepted the idea.  
The three-week-long POI each LIFL and LIF received from the U.S. and HN SOF 
teams appeared to be sufficient to put the LIFs to work.  Critical to this step was for the 
SOF teams to remain partnered with the LIFs to ensure they correctly employed the 
training they received and to answer questions regarding any ambiguous situations they 
encountered.  In some cases, the SOF teams had to take the lead during the execution of 
some of the LIF’s daily duties.  This would continue until the LIFs displayed enough 
competence to perform the duties unilaterally and without assistance from the SOF 
teams.  For each of the sites that received assistance a direct correlation could be drawn 
between the capabilities of the LIFLs and their forces and the credibility each LIF gained 
in villagers’ eyes thanks to the security they provided.88 
It was during the three-week POI for the LIFL that one of the teams encountered 
an issue that almost threatened progress of the program in that particular village.  Coca 
production had historically been a large source of revenue for the village and the LIFL 
was reluctant to cease these activities.  Despite intense efforts from the partnered SOF 
team, the LIFL was not willing to conform.  It was not until local powerbrokers became 
involved in the negotiations that the LIFL was made to accept the notion that the 
cultivation of coca was only a short-term fix to a long-term problem for the community.  
An agreement between the SOF unit and the LIFL was reached, and training of the LIFL 
was able to continue. 
As the capabilities of each LIF continued to improve and local governments took 
more and more initiative, the SOF teams began to depart and let the LIFL take full 
responsibility for security.  HN conventional forces providing outer security for the 
supported sites were able to scale back their original manning numbers as well, but didn’t 
pull out completely until villagers from each of the supported sites proved able to 
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successfully band together against the insurgents on successive occasions.  Insurgent 
support dropped off dramatically in each of the villages, forcing the insurgents to find 
support and sanctuary elsewhere. 
4. HN Takes the Lead – Insurgency Declines 
Having been successfully involved in the implementation of the COIN strategy 
against the insurgents, members of the original five HN SOF teams that were partnered 
with U.S. SOF put together a cadre so that they could begin training their own SOF teams 
to eventually conduct the new strategy without U.S. assistance.  Thus, while the next five 
U.S. and HN SOF teams identified and embedded with subsequent villages, the HN cadre 
were busy training their own SOF.  By the time the second iteration of U.S. and HN SOF 
teams was finished with its villages, HN SOF were ready to take over the COIN program 
on their own.   
Effects of the COIN strategy became apparent to the government of Country Y 
shortly after the first iteration of supported sites was established.  Insurgent activity in 
those areas was severely hampered as the popular support they once could count on from 
the lower-class peasants began to falter. Many insurgents recognized that their once 
popular ideology and their opposition to the government were no longer accepted and, as 
a result, their support base nearly ceased to exist. This forced the remaining insurgents to 
migrate to regions that had not yet been pacified but were not strategically important.  It 
took several years before the insurgent organization in Country Y was degraded into little 
more than a band of hardcore followers.
89
 These hardcore followers were forced into 
hiding in some of the most uninhabitable terrain in of the country where they were safe 
from security forces, but had little means of presenting a significant threat to the central 
government. 
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D. ANALYSIS 
In both scenarios the reader can see how, by using the ideas established in this 
thesis, it should be possible to establish a successful LIFL and LIF. The prescriptions 
outlined have enough flexibility built into them that with slight modification, they can be 
applied to most COIN campaigns.  In each of the two scenarios, the country had a 
different relationship with the U.S.  Country Y had a long standing relationship with the 
U.S., and allowed in a large U.S. military force, and did not mind for others in the region 
to know that it was accepting U.S. assistance. In contrast, Country X did not have the 
same history with the U.S.  and sought to keep the number of U.S. forces on the ground 
very small and very much out of view of others in the region for fear of being seen as a 
U.S. puppet.   
In each scenario, U.S. SOF with active HN participation were able to find the 
right LIFL, and to properly train that LIFL and his force to be able to assist in  providing 
security for the local area.  Once security was established, support and aid from NGOs as 
well as the HN and the U.S. was able to reach these areas. At the same time, insurgent 
support dropped off dramatically, forcing the insurgents to find support and sanctuary 
elsewhere.  
While contemplating these scenarios one thing that the reader has to bear in mind 
is that human relations are very challenging and they need to be nurtured and developed 
over time before any action can be taken. Additionally, when it comes to LIFLs even the 
best choices can produce negative outcomes and alter existing balances of power in 
unforeseen ways. In order to avoid this, the planners, coordinators, and operators on the 
ground need to be able to mitigate such risks by consistently reinforcing relationships 
with the LIF, the community, and the government. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Recent experience has shown that it can take several years, sometimes spanning 
more than a decade for an insurgency to be pushed back below its point of critical mass 
to a point where it is no longer a significant threat to the government.
91
  This point is 
typically reached only with the dedicated assistance of FMFs.
92
  However, COIN 
conflicts require a commitment of time and resources that few countries today are willing 
to stomach or afford.  Despite the many lessons learned, and the myriad of different 
theories and strategies that exist, history indicates that COIN conflicts are some of the 
most difficult and expensive for an FMF to execute.  Fighting an enemy that is elusive 
and does not abide by any agreed upon laws of warfare can only be accomplished with 
the support of the indigenous population.   
One of Mao Tse-tung’s most famous aphorisms is that “the people are like water 
and the army is like fish.”93  What Mao implied is that the insurgents need the population 
or they will cease to exist.    What Mao implied is that by separating the insurgents from 
the population the insurgents will cease to exist.  Training local indigenous forces in rural 
areas of a country where insurgents often reside is one strategy that FMFs have used with 
success.  But a COIN strategy is only as good as those chosen to implement it, 
particularly when talking about the HN.  LIFLs, as well as those who will serve as the 
local indigenous forces, must be carefully selected to isolate insurgents from the 
population.  The LIF will need to establish local security, gain the support and 
participation of the local populace, and facilitate local development initiatives in order to 
create local governance in under-governed areas of the country.  The LIFL and his force 
will require practical training that is unique to the local social environment in order to 
attain a level of proficiency appropriate for carrying out their tasks effectively.  But the 
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partnership between the FMF and LIF does not end there.  The FMF must remain 
partnered with the LIF following the training until the LIFL and his force are capable of 
performing their roles in a COIN environment unilaterally.   
Efforts by the FMF to expand this strategy in a supported country must be 
exercised with caution.  The importance of finding the right LIFL, creating a responsible 
LIF via training, and continuing to mentor both cannot be overstated.  A lack of 
appreciation for the importance of any of these factors may not seem immediately 
significant, but over time will lead to the likelihood of instability not only for the local 
government, but potentially for the provincial and central governments too, especially if 
those governments are weak.  A LIFL who volunteers for the job for reasons of personal 
or familial gain will at some point create dissension in his community.  If the LIFL does 
not possess or have the potential to adopt the leader characteristics identified in this thesis 
he will have difficulty building cohesion between his force, members of the community, 
and the local government.  Likewise, if the LIFL is not susceptible to being leveraged by 
his partnered FMF even when the national-level goals and interests are not aligned, than 
the LIFL may hinder efforts to set the conditions needed to drive out the insurgents and 
establish local governance.  This is why it is imperative that the guidelines established in 
this thesis be referenced prior to and throughout partnering with indigenous forces. 
A. REALITY OF THE SITUATION 
An FMF cannot always expect to have control over who will be selected as the 
LIFL, and when this happens the FMF needs to be able to plan accordingly.  National 
pride, pursuit of political agendas, or simply fear of authorizing the creation of a force 
that may one day threaten the government are all viable reasons for a HN to limit the 
authority a FMF has in selecting LIFLs.  In circumstances such as these, commanders of 
the FMF have to make the decision to either work with the LIFLs given to them, try and 
negotiate terms where the LIFLs are selected based on mutual agreement, or reject the 
partnership.
94
  In situations where the FMF has limited control over the selection of 
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LIFLs it becomes paramount that it references the characteristics listed in this thesis and 
chooses the LIFL that best matches the outlined criteria.   
Another area this thesis touches on, but has left for future exploration, is what 
should happen when the HN government replaces a LIFL with someone who does not 
have the same goals and interests as the FMF.  Again, the FMF will have to determine 
whether there are other alternatives to accepting that individual.  This suggests that it 
would be worthwhile to study how to best leverage imposed LIFLs.  Involvement in 
illicit or illegal activities, and disputes with neighboring tribes or different ethnicities, are 
just a few possible sources of misaligned interests, but ones that must be overcome by the 
FMF and the LIFL if the LIFL is to create a stable community that insurgents cannot 
exploit.  As noted in Chapter  II, there will be times when it is acceptable for interests to 
not be aligned and the FMF will have to overlook these divergences.  On the other hand, 
there will also be times when it is critical that the LIFL and FMF agree on a common 
goal.  Studying how to leverage corrupt or non-compliant, even obstructionist LIFLs in 
situations such as these could prove extremely useful.   
No matter how important the concept of working by, with, and through local 
indigenous forces is for successfully conducting COIN, this concept alone is only one 
element in the combined overall strategy.  The bottom-up approach that requires training 
local indigenous forces and creating local governance must be complemented by a top-
down approach from the central government.  Common ground has to be found between 
the two.  Effective two-way communication between local and higher governments is 
essential to understand the conditions that allowed the insurgency to develop in the first 
place, as well as to address the needs and expectations of the local communities in order 
to break their ties with the insurgents.
95
   
Attacking insurgent networks is another important component of an effective 
COIN strategy.  Steadily eliminating the leadership of insurgent organizations at the same 
time that their support base is being reduced can cause panic within the organization and 
thereby help set conditions for the insurgency to implode.  A final component of a sound 
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COIN strategy is the implementation of a reconciliation program that offers insurgents a 
way of life that is more appealing to them than anything the insurgency promises.  The 
opportunities created as a result of visible social and economic improvement in selected 
villages can help create these favorable conditions for insurgents wishing to reconcile.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
SOF units tasked to partner with and train local indigenous forces in a COIN 
conflict should find the ideas presented in this thesis useful when they have influence 
over who is to be chosen as the LIFL, how the local indigenous force will be trained, and 
how long the partnership following the LIF’s formal training might last.  How to select 
the right LIFL and LIF and then properly train them to secure their villages from 
insurgent threat draws on  the VSO program, but should nonetheless be flexible enough 
to be used in any country where an insurgency exists.  Units that find themselves working 
with indigenous forces at the local level should reference the steps outlined in this thesis 
to help ensure they are choosing the best and most compatible indigenous leader and 
force to partner with.  By adhering to such a program, the FMF will not only have an 
easier time training the LIFL and his force, but will also help to reduce the support base 
the insurgents have to draw from, as well as aid in setting the conditions for long term 
stability and prosperity at every level.   
FMF Commanders responsible for developing military strategies in COIN 
conflicts should include in their plan the training of HN forces to become the primary 
counterinsurgent force in charge of establishing security at the local level.  This should 
include training a cadre of HN forces that can then go on to train their own SOF in how 
to assess and choose an appropriate LIFL and LIF, as well as how to train them to 
conduct COIN operations at the village level.  In order to expedite this process, these 
efforts should begin and run concurrently with other FMF efforts.  As the concept 
matures and HN SOF becomes more receptive to learning to conduct COIN on their own, 
the FMF can begin the transition of authority to the HN. 
One final recommendation to FMF Commanders is to consider the use of properly 
trained home-grown indigenous security forces as a permanent part of national security, 
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especially in countries where the government is weak and there are not enough existing 
HN security forces to secure rural outlying areas.  To the degree that the right LIFL and 
force are chosen and trained, this concept can help fill the void created when there is 
insufficient funding or resourcing to field a large professional security force; too often 
insurgents can make use of grievances that weak governments unintentionally aid in 
creating.  If local indigenous forces are successful at dislodging insurgents from their 
villages there is no reason to believe that the insurgents will not return if these forces are 
disbanded without a replacement.  With the correct measures put into place, local forces 
could remain both credible and accountable to their local and central governments alike 
indefinitely.   
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